Intelligence Report 12/24/01

Intelligence Report 12/24/01

24 DECEMBER 2001

This report is provided as a guide to Industry and Law Enforcement to stay informed of security issues within the MSO Mobile Area of Operations

Hidden Knife / Coin

At a time when security should be at a high point, the US Mint has made available the 1997 American Eagle Silver Dollar Coin. This latest coin has been antiqued to give it an "aged" appearance. Features a hardened steel pocketknife mechanism that opens on either side to reveal a knife blade and nail file.

Security Managers should be aware if conducting weapons searches that this product is out there.

Bioterror in Israel

When Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Zion Square in Jerusalem on December 1st, there were three surprises to the horror they caused. The first was a new, much stronger type of explosive that probably came from Eastern Europe or Russia.

The second was the timing of a second bomb that was intended to kill rescue workers. And the third was that the bombs contained rat poison, meaning that the attack added a new dimension to Palestinian terrorism -- biological warfare.

Rat poison is an especially nasty bio-terror weapon. Most rat poisons are made up of chemicals called anti-coagulants with trade names like warfarin, fumarin, diphacinone and bromadiolone. Some also contain poisons such as strychnine. All work more or less the same way. A small mammal eats the poison and soon gets sick and dies from internal hemorrhaging. This happens because a mammalian needs to constantly manufacture coagulants to manage internal body functions. When the coagulant is blocked, uncontrolled internal bleeding occurs.

The Palestinian terrorists clearly understood why they packed their bombs with rat poison. These bombs are made up of an explosive charge and are packed with nails and metal and glass shards and bits of steel wire. These materials are designed to kill or maim the victims of the bomb, spreading destruction over a wide area. If the nails, metal and glass are coated with rat poison, then anyone wounded by them would be more likely to die from hemorrhaging. Interior Minister Uzi Landau noted that in the December 1st attack the explosion itself consumed much of the rat poison. Had the rat poison worked, the bombers might have killed more than a hundred people on December 1st.

The use of bio-terror weapons is being pursued by Palestinian terrorists and by Al Qaeda too. In Afghanistan U.S. Special Forces have discovered many germ warfare laboratories. They have found anthrax powder and a poison called ricin. Ricin, which is made from castor beans, is much more deadly than rat poison.

Ricin is known to have been a favorite of the old-KGB and other former Warsaw pact intelligence services. It was used in the murder of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov by the Bulgarian secret service in November, 1978. Ricin can be put into an aerosol or into a bomb. Ricin, unlike rat poison, is more stable in intense heat. While rat poison kills by making it impossible for the blood to clot, ricin works in a different way in the body but with lethal results. Not only Al Qaeda, but also Iraq is producing ricin and may have given it to the Palestinians. It is not surprising, given the rising threat, that in every terror attack in Israel HAZMAT teams equipped with gas masks and protective suits are part of the rescue effort.

We also know that radioactive materials can be combined with conventional explosives and terrorists know how to use such weapons. The first example of this was in a Moscow Park in November 1995 where Chechen terrorists planted a radiological weapon. Luckily it was found and disarmed. Chechen terrorists are among the so-called foreign fighters helping Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda also has gotten help from Pakistani nuclear scientists, from Iraq, and from smugglers who have transported Cobalt 60, Cesium 137 and Strontium 90 to Pakistan and on into Afghanistan. Such “dirty” bombs can unleash clouds of radioactive dust, causing severe and generally fatal cases of radioactive poisoning in the victims.

Just as Israel, which faces Palestinian terrorism supported by states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, the United States faces terrorism from Islamic groups.

(Source: Jewish News)

Workshop for Maritime Security

The Coast Guard is holding a public workshop to discuss security procedures, programs, and capabilities within marine transportation systems. Discussions will focus on identifying possible security measures, standards, and responses to threats and acts of crime and terrorism. We encourage interested parties to attend the workshop and submit comments for discussion during the workshop. We also seek comments to the docket, especially from any party unable to attend the workshop.

The public workshop will be held at the Grand Hyatt Washington at Washington Center, 1000 H Street, NW., Washington DC., 20001, Phone (202) 582-1234.

The workshop may end early if all of the agenda topics have been covered and if the people attending have no further comments.

Persons wishing to make presentations or needing additional information must contact CDR Mike Rand at the Vessel and Facility Security Division (G-MP), U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, mrand@comdt.uscg.mil or at 202-267-6853.

For questions on viewing or submitting material to the docket, call Dorothy Beard, Chief of Dockets, Department of Transportation, at 202-366-5149 by January 7, 2002. Comments and related material must reach the Docket Management Facility on or before February 14, 2002

You may submit your comments directly to the Docket Management Facility. To make sure that your comments and related material do not enter the docket [USCG-2001-11137] more than once, please submit them by only one of the following means:

Electronically through the Web Site for the Docket Management System at http://dms.dot.gov

By fax to the Docket Management Facility at 202-493-2251

By delivery to room PL-401 on the Plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone number is 202-366-9329.

By mail to the Docket Management Facility, (USCG-2001-11137), U.S. Department of Transportation, room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001.

The Docket Management Facility maintains the public docket for this notice. Comments and material received from the public, as well as documents mentioned in this notice as being available in the docket, will become part of this docket and will be available for inspection or copying at room PL-401 on the Plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also find this notice in the docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov/. Comments in the docket are available to the public for inspection and further comment, including proprietary information if submitted.

Topic of Discussion: Security of Marine Transportation Systems

The Coast Guard is conducting this workshop to assess existing MTS security standards and measures to gather ideas on possible improvements. To facilitate discourse during the workshop attendees should, before attending the workshop, evaluate threats to MTS security in such areas as physical security, operational measures, and access control. After recognizing threats to MTS security, the public should evaluate existing MTS security standards and measures to identify vulnerabilities, and then develop possible adjustments to decrease those vulnerabilities. The workshop will provide the public an opportunity to present ideas and to discuss the threats, vulnerabilities, and adjustments to MTS security. In the future we may propose new or amendatory rules that would address issues broached during the workshop.

Three general areas of MTS security, to wit, physical security, operational measures, and access control, will almost certainly arise during the workshop. Persons planning to attend the workshop should be prepared to discuss these general areas as they relate to security, protection, and economic performance of the maritime industry. Workshop attendees will be asked to discuss a host of possible costs and benefits that could result from identifying and addressing physical security, operational measures, and access-control vulnerabilities.

We request information about all current Federal, State, and local governmental laws, procedures, regulations, and standards that are either functioning or that are planned. We also request industry to provide any current and planned standards and procedures covering the security of vessels and facilities.

Finally, we request recommendations toward needed improvement or added regulations. Examples of the types of information we are interested in receiving are:

Physical security. Discussions of the physical security of personnel, ports, facilities, and vessels might include, but are not limited to:

Measures and standards currently being used at a facility or on board a vessel.

Criteria for measures and standards at a facility or on board a vessel such as fences, gates, alarms, lighting, antennas, and personnel on watch.

Security technologies currently used or possible to make ports, facilities, and vessels more secure against the threat or commission of crimes or terrorism.

Operational measures. Discussions of the operational measures for personnel, ports, facilities, and vessels might include, but are not limited to:

Effectiveness of existing passenger terminals and passenger vessels security plan requirements.

Effectiveness of existing terminal and security plans for ports, vessels, offshore platforms, and industry.

Facilities and vessels, other than passenger terminals and passenger vessels regulated in 33 CFR parts 120 and 128, which should have security plans.

Response plans in place to prevent criminal and terrorist acts and threats.

Details of measures taken in response to such acts and threats.

Necessity of MTS security committees and the sharing of intelligence and threat advisories between the Coast Guard and industry.

Criteria and need for a tracking system for vessels trafficking the navigable waters of the United States.

Access control. Discussions of access control for personnel, passengers, and cargo might include, but are not limited to:

Criteria and process for background check prior to employment.

Check points that screen personnel, passengers, cargo, and baggage.

Additional information, currently used or deemed necessary to document or certificate personnel, facilities, and vessels.

Types of credentials (such as identification cards, employment cards, and access passes) used to limit access.

Security Begins with You

If you observe individuals attempting unauthorized access to your facility contact the local authorities immediately. Then inform the US Coast Guard Intelligence Division at:

(251) 441-5755

24hrs at: 441-5121

Radical Islamic Groups

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, and particularly since the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November of that year, radical Islam has attracted widespread press attention as the driving ideology of the most active Middle Eastern terrorist groups and state sponsors. Of 19 Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed in the Congressional Research Service Report, “Terrorism: Near Easter Groups and State Sponsors, 2001”, ten are Islamic organizations.

Beginning this week, we will begin to look at Terrorist groups associated as an Islamic group. While Al Qaeda is in the forefront of our focus, it is important to bear in mind that these other groups still present a potential threat to the United States.

Hizballah (Party of God)

Lebanon-based Hizballah appears to be groping for direction following Israel's May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon. Having accomplished its main goal of ousting Israel from southern Lebanon, some in the organization want it to change from a guerrilla and terrorist organization into a mainstream political movement, focusing mainly on its work in parliament (it holds 8 out of 128 total seats) and its charity and reconstruction works with Lebanon's Shiite community. Hardliners in Hizballah want it to battle Israeli forces over the border and in the disputed Shib'a farms area. Other hardliners in the organization believe that the Israeli withdrawal validated its guerrilla strategy and are helping Palestinian groups apply similar tactics against Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Although initially encouraged by Hizballah's relative restraint following the Israeli withdrawal, Israel and the United States remain wary of Hizballah. Hizballah's 15-year military campaign against Israeli and Israeli surrogate forces in southern Lebanon - activity that is not technically considered terrorism by the U.S. State Department - often-included rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. Even though the United Nations has certified that Israel's withdrawal is complete, Hizballah has asserted that Israel still occupies some Lebanese territory (the Shib'a farms) and, on that basis, has conducted a few military attacks on Israel since the withdrawal.

In October 2000, Hizballah captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shib'a farms area and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant whom it had lured to Lebanon. Hizballah has indicated a willingness to return these captives in exchange for several Lebanese prisoners captured or kidnaped by Israel since the late 1980s.

Founded in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics inspired by the Islamic revolutionary ideology of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, Hizballah's original goal was to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon.

During the 1980s, Hizballah was a principal sponsor of Anti-Western, and particularly anti-U.S., terrorism. It is known or suspected to have been involved in suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy (April 1983), the U.S. Marine barracks (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18 Navy and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy annex (September 1984), all in Beirut. It also hijacked TWA Flight 847 in 1985, killing a Navy diver, Robert Stethem who was onboard and its factions were responsible for the detention of most, if not all, U.S. and Western hostages held in Lebanon during the 1980s and early 1990s. Eighteen Americans were held hostage in Lebanon during that period, three of which were killed.

In the early 1990s, Hizballah also demonstrated an ability to conduct terrorism far from the Middle East. In May 1999, Argentina's Supreme Court, after an official investigation, formally blamed Hizballah for the March 17, 1992 bombing of Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires and issued an arrest warrant for Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah. Hizballah did not claim responsibility for the attack outright, but it released a surveillance tape of the embassy, implying responsibility.

In May 1998, FBI Director Louis Freeh told Argentina the FBI believes that Hizballah, working with Iranian diplomats, was also responsible for the July 18, 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires that left 86 dead.6 In July 1999, Argentine investigators brought charges against 20 suspected Argentine collaborators in the AMIA bombings, and the trial is set to begin in

September 2001.

Hizballah has continued to conduct surveillance of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon and its personnel, according to recent Patterns reports, but no major terrorist attacks have been attributed to it since 1994. However, according to numerous press reports and Hizballah leaders' own statements, the organization is helping Palestinian groups fight against Israel in the latest Palestinian uprising, which began in September 2000.

In late August 2001, Jordanian officials discovered a cache of rockets at a Hizballah-owned location in Jordan, igniting fears that Hizballah might fire rockets on Israel from there or might provide the weapons to Palestinian militants there or in the West

Bank.

Hizballah's Persian Gulf Connections.

Hizballah maintains connections with similar groups in the Persian Gulf. Saudi and Bahraini investigations of anti-regime unrest have revealed the existence of local chapters of Hizballah composed of Shiite Muslims, many of whom have studied in Iran's theological seminaries and received terrorist training there and in Lebanon. Saudi and U.S. officials believe that Saudi Shiite Muslims with connections to Lebanese Hizballah were responsible for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex for U.S. military personnel, near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

This allegation was reaffirmed in the June 2001 U.S. indictments of 14 Khobar suspects. According to Patterns 1998, in November 1998 Bahraini authorities uncovered an alleged bomb plot that they blamed on persons linked to Bahraini and Lebanese Hizballah.

Patterns 1999 reiterates that Hizballah receives “substantial” amounts of financial assistance, weapons, and political and organizational support from both Syria and Iran, although it does not mention specific figures.

Then Secretary of State Christopher said on May 21, 1996 that Iran gave Hizballah about $100 million per year, a figure that U.S. officials have not since deviated from. About 150 of Iran's Revolutionary Guards remain in Lebanon to coordinate Iran's aid to Hizballah. Syria permits Iran to supply weapons to Hizballah through the international airport in Damascus, although a recent Turkish shutdown of the air corridor connecting Iran and Syria has made Iranian deliveries more difficult.

Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs).

8 Hizballah members named as SDTs include: (1) Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, who is about 43 and has led Hizballah since 1993; (2) Imad Mughniyah, the 39 year old Hizballah intelligence officer and alleged holder of some Western hostages in the 1980s; (3) Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the 64-year-old senior Shiite cleric and leading spiritual figure of Hizballah; and (4) Subhi Tufayli, the 54 year old former Hizballah Secretary General who leads a radical breakaway faction of Hizballah.

Overview of the Marine Transportation System

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the attack on USS COLE, a Navy ship moored in Yemen that killed 17 sailors and injured 37 in October of 2000, make it clear that the marine transportation system faces unprecedented threats.

The United States can ill afford to ignore the potential vulnerability of its marine transportation system (MTS). More than 95 percent of U.S. foreign trade by volume now travels by sea. The MTS, whether at port facilities in coastal waters or along inland waterways, plays a vital role in America's transportation network.

In addition, U.S. ports handle more than 17 million containers each year. Containers raise a specific concern because they are, by design, intermodal. A container unloaded at a port on one day is often deployed deep into America's heartland soon thereafter by truck or rail. With only a small percentage of those containers currently being inspected by federal agencies, the potentiality for illegal activities is enormous.

Ports are not the only potential maritime targets; other such targets include but are not limited to--tank vessels, passenger vessels, cargo vessels, facilities for exploration and production of oil, power plants, bridges, other critical infrastructure, and the marine environment also need protection. Furthermore, the United States has more than 95,000 miles of coastline, providing many infiltration routes into the country.

It is important to note that the Coast Guard and Congress were concerned about MTS security even before September 11, 2001. Indeed, the Port and Maritime Security Act was introduced at the close of the 106th Congress. If passed, the Act would, among other things, authorize the Coast Guard to establish an MTS security task force in consultation with the U.S. Customs Service, and the Maritime Administration.

The proposed Act was prompted by the work of the President's Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, which subsequently issued a report highlighting the threats to our nation's ports. The Commission found that:

The state of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair, and, in a few cases, good. There are no widely accepted standards or guidelines for physical, procedural, and personnel security for seaports, although some ports are making outstanding efforts to improve security. Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within it is often lacking. Practices to restrict or control the access of vehicles to vessels, the receipt and delivery of cargo, and the processing of passengers at seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced, increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo or contraband. Many ports do not issue identification cards to personnel to restrict the access to vessels, the receipt and delivery of cargo, and the processing of passengers.

Vessel manifests, Import and export, are sometimes deficient for import risk assessment and export control. Information from them is easier to use for drug enforcement and commercial compliance if it is received as electronic data before the arrival of vessels.

Although the Federal government has established formal structures for coordinating governmental efforts and has developed national strategies to address drug trafficking, terrorism, other domestic and international crime, and to guarantee economic mobility, seaport security per se has not been adequately addressed. Stronger and more focused coordination among agencies and between the public and private sectors to enhance Security is needed.

Upcoming Terrorist Calender

12/24/1951

Libya

Independence Day

12/25/1979

Afghanistan, Russia

Invasion by Soviet Troops

12/25/1991

Commonwealth of Independent States

U.S. Recognition

President Bush formally recognized twelve of the former Soviet republics on December 25, 1991, eleven of which are members of the CIS. President Bush also indicated that the U.S. would establish as soon as possible diplomatic relations with six of the republics but that diplomatic relations with the others would only be established when they met certain political conditions.

12/25/1978

Cambodia

Fall of Phnom Penh

Khmer Rouge regime toppled from power, as Phnom Penh falls to invading Vietnamese forces. Khmer Rouge forces retreat west, and set up base camps on the Thai border and in the Cardamon Mountains to continue resistance against the Vietnamese.

12/25/1991

Russia

Russia Successor to U.S.S.R.

Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as president of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991 and transferred control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal to Russian president Boris Yeltsin. A few hours later, the United States recognized Russia as the successor state to the Soviet Union. These actions marked the end of the Soviet Union 74 years after the Bolshevik Revolution.

12/25/1982

Senegal

Casamance Movement Founded

MFDC, the Casamance Separatist Movement, was founded. Armed attacks by the group have occurred on this date, to mark the anniversary of the founding of the MFDC.

12/25/1991

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Gorbachev Resigns as President

Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as the last president of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991 and he transferred control of the Soviet nuclear weapons to Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union. Although the USSR effectively ceased to exist on December 25, a group of Supreme Soviet members voted on December 26 to end the country.

12/25/1991

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

U.S.S.R. Ceases To Exist

12/26/1991

Algeria

FIS Wins First Round of Voting

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of voting in Algeria's parliamentary elections. The second round of elections, scheduled for January 16, 1992, were cancelled when Algerian president Benjedid resigned on January 12, 1992.

12/26/1893

China (People's Republic of)

Birthday of Mao Ze Dong

12/26/1893

Peru

Birthday of Mao Zedong

The birthday of Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong has been marked by the Sendero Luminoso (SL) guerrilla organization by terrorist attacks.

12/26/1968

Philippines

Founding of the CPP

Founding of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) by Jose Maria Sison.

12/26/0000

Taiwan

Constitution Day

12/26/1991

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Legislature Votes Dissolution

Although the Soviet Union effectively ceased to exist on December 25, 1991 with the resignation of President Gorbachev and his handing control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal over to Russian president Yeltsin, a small group of members of the Senior Soviet Legislature, the Supreme Soviet, met on December 26, 1991 and formally voted the Soviet Union out of existence.

12/27/1985

Austria

Attack on the Vienna Airport

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) attacked the Vienna airport.

12/27/1949

Indonesia

Transfer of Sovereignty

Sovereignty was transferred from the Netherlands following independence.

12/27/1985

Italy

Attack on Rome Airport by ANO

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) attacked the Rome airport.

12/28/1972

Israel, Thailand

Embassy in Bangkok Seized

Black September terrorists took hostages after seizing the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. The hostages were released in exchange for safe conduct.

12/28/0000

Nepal

National Holiday

This holiday celebrates the king's birthday.

12/29/1945

Serbia-Montenegro

Proclamation of the Republic

Commemorates the proclamation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.