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Summary
This article reviews the liability of corrections and related personnel when medical complaints by prisoners are not addressed properly or in a timely manner.
For more information, you may contact the author through e-mail by clicking on her name below:
Dr. Jayroe may also be reached by telephone at:
(334) 386-7583
ICJE articles have been prepared for educational and information purposes only. They are not intended to be published as legal advice or legal opinion about any specific subject matter. Transmission of this ICJE information is not intended to create, and receipt does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship between the author(s), ICJE and the reader. The opinions expressed in the articles found herein are those of the author(s), and not necessarily those of ICJE. Officers and departments should review any proposed change in policy or procedure with the appropriate professional authority or advisor prior to implementing any of the advice found herein. All articles may be reproduced and distributed free of charge with attribution.
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Corrections Liability
ICJE Feature Article, April 4, 2002
The Eighth Amendment and Medical Related Section 1983 Claims
Monica E. Jayroe, J.D., Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Faulkner University
A Bivens action is a civil lawsuit filed by an inmate against the officials or entities having custody of him. These suits are filed under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and are steadily increasing in number each year. These suits are filed in the civil division of the federal court having jurisdiction over the prisoner, and all allege a violation of the inmate's civil rights in one form or another.
Many Section 1983 suits pertain to a violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment Rights through the delay or denial of medical treatment. Specifically, the inmate filing the lawsuit alleges that during incarceration, he or she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment via the delay or denial of medical treatment.
The Supreme Court of the United States established the standard for Section 1983 claims involving the delay or denial of medical treatment in 1976 in Estelle v. Gamble. (1) In Estelle, the Court said that a prisoner (plaintiff) must show that the defendant acted with "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoner" in order to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.
The person acting with deliberate indifference can be a law enforcement officer, a private individual working under contract with the government entity, a prison doctor, or any other person with whom custody of the prisoner is manifested. In order to protect oneself from such claims, one must understand how the courts interpret "deliberate indifference" and "serious medical need."
A medical need is classified as serious if there has been either "a diagnosis by a physician as [a condition] mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." If there has been a diagnosis by a physician of a medical need, that information will appear in the prisoner's file. For example, if the prisoner is known to be diabetic, suffer from arthritis, or to have a heart condition, that information should be noted in the prison records.
In Estelle, the U.S. Supreme Court said that medical conditions constitutionally requiring treatment were those "producing physical torture, a lingering death, or those that could cause pain and suffering."
In Brown v. Hughes,(2) the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a broken foot, sustained in a fight was obvious, and that the foot remained untreated for several hours constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Here, the delay in treatment was a violation under Section 1983 because the failure to treat was not explained and produced pain and suffering.
A prisoner who complains of symptoms associated with a heart attack or stroke also falls into the category of one whose condition is obvious, or easily recognized as a condition requiring medical attention. Any condition, which if left untreated for any length of time will worsen or may result in death, is generally deemed one where the need for immediate treatment is obvious.
In addition to showing that there was a serious medical need, the prisoner must also show that he complained of his medical condition and was met with a deliberate indifference towards his medical needs. This has both a subjective and objective component. (3)
“The subjective component requires the knowledge of the need for medical care and the intentional refusal to provide that care.” (4) In other words, if the officer or other person with whom custody rests recognizes the need for medical care, and then intentionally refuses to provide the necessary care - the standard has been violated.
The objective component of the deliberate indifference standard requires that there is evidence in the court record that there was a serious medical need, and that the person in charge of custody intentionally refused to provide treatment after recognizing the need. This can be accomplished by showing that there was a delay in treatment, or an outright denial of treatment. Most cases involve delayed treatment rather than a denial of treatment. In Harris v. Coweta County(5) the Court held that “deliberate indifference can be inferred from [an] unexplained delay in treating a known or obvious serious medical condition.”
Consequently, before a defendant will be found liable under Section 1983, the court will examine not only the nature of the prisoner's medical complaints, but also the length of delay in providing treatment, and the reason that treatment was delayed. If a prisoner's condition appears to be life threatening or one that will worsen without immediate medical assistance, a delay in treatment violates the standard, thus creating liability under Section 1983.
Footnotes
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1. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2nd 251 (1976).
 2. Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1990).
3. Hill v. DeKalb Regional Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 1994).
 4. Palermo, et al. v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 133 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2001) citing Hill v. DeKalb Regional Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 1994). Emphasis supplied.
 5. Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3rd 388, 394 (11th Cir. 1994). Emphasis supplied.
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