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Intelligence Report, 12/17/01 | Homeland Security Report April 2002 | Intelligence Report 12/24/01 | IR, 1/1-11/02 | IR 2/13/02 | IR 2/8/02 | IR 2/22 - 25/02 | Title 147 | HSB 5/24 - 27/02 | HSR 7/7 - 14/02 | HSR 7/29 - 8/12/02 | HSR 56 | HSR 62 | Buckle Handcuff Key | HSR 80 | HSR 85 | Concealable Weapons Database
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ICJE articles and reports have been prepared for educational and information purposes only. They are not intended to be published as legal advice or legal opinion about any specific subject matter. Transmission of this ICJE information is not intended to create, and receipt does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship between the author(s), ICJE and the reader. The opinions expressed in the articles found herein are those of the author(s), and not necessarily those of ICJE. Officers and departments should review any proposed change in policy or procedure with the appropriate professional authority or advisor prior to implementation.
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HSB 5/2-6/02
Homeland Security Bulletin Number 3
02 MAY 2002
This Open Source report is provided as a guide to Industry and Law Enforcement to stay informed of National Security issues.
OFFICER SAFETY ALERT - WEAPONS WARNING
![]() This weapon is being advertised as “The World's Smallest Pistol.” The pistol is so small that it can completely fit inside a pack of cigarettes, pocket, or in the palm of a hand. The large caliber round the weapon fires (.45ACP or .38/. 357 magnum) poses a distinct threat to law enforcement officers. Officers should exercise caution when conduction pat-downs and searching prisoners.
Homeland Security Bulletin Number 6 06 MAY 2002
This Open Source report is provided as a guide to Industry and Law Enforcement to stay informed of National Security issues.
Concealed Knife / Handcuff Key
![]() This key has a sharp serrated blade knife concealed in a key shaped case with handcuff key. When extended the overall length is 5 inches. Law Enforcement and Security personnel should consider checking for keys like this when conducting security checks or searching suspects.
Study Finds Shortcomings in U.S. Emergency Preparedness
A survey backed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) finds that many emergency response workers don't think they are adequately prepared for major disasters, such as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001.
Conducted for the CDC by the Rand group, a policy research and analysis organization, the study was based on discussions among emergency workers at a December 2001 conference. Fire fighters, police, emergency medical workers and others called for improvements in personal protective gear, disaster site management, and information exchange and management.
Following is the text of a CDC fact sheet about the study:
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Fact Sheet
Many emergency response workers do not believe that they are adequately prepared to respond to a major disaster such as the World Trade Center Attack or the anthrax scare, according to a new report of worker input funded by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
The report shows a need for research, training and other strategic approaches to help protect emergency responders in terrorist attacks. The recommendations are based on the lessons learned from the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon last September and on the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.
The report, released by Rand, summarizes discussions from a two-day workshop held in December 2001 in New York City. The workshop convened more than 150 participants, including fire fighters, fire fighting special operations, emergency medical services, law enforcement, construction and other trade services, and health and safety professionals, including state and federal agencies.
The report also highlights the need for a research agenda that outlines comprehensive personal protective technology, and improved federal education and training programs and other activities pertaining to the health and safety of emergency responders in rescue, recovery, and restoration efforts.
According to the recommendations included in the report, important areas for research and planning include:
Development of guidelines for selection and use of appropriate personal protective equipment in long-duration disaster response and bio-terrorism response.
Research and planning to effectively outfit all responders at sites of large-scale incidents with appropriate personal protective equipment, and to facilitate standardization and inter-operability of protective equipment among emergency responder organizations.
Development of guidelines and procedures to enforce the use of personal protective equipment at large-scale disaster sites, and to establish effective site management as early as possible in disaster response.
Identifying ways to provide useful, real-time safety and health information to responders at incident sites, and to ensure appropriate training on the use of personal protective equipment.
The report will be accessible from the NIOSH website at www.cdc.gov/niosh
Terrorism, the Future and U.S. Policy
Continuing on with this next series regarding terrorism, we will look at the definitions and a framework of U.S. Policy regarding terrorism. Much of this text is derived from the Congressional Research Service brief, “Terrorism, the Future and U.S. Policy” updated September 13th, 2001. Much has occurred since this report was published. Yet the foundations, definitions and U.S. resolve against terrorism remain consistent.
Definitions
There is no universally accepted definition of international terrorism. One definition widely used in U.S. government circles, and incorporated into law, defines “international terrorism” as terrorism involving the citizens or property of more than one country.
Terrorism is broadly defined as politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. A “terrorist group” is defined as a group which practices or which has significant subgroups which practice terrorism (22 U.S.C. 2656f).
One potential shortfall of this traditional definition is its focus on groups and group members and exclusion of individual (non-group organized) terrorist activity, which has recently risen in frequency and visibility. Another possible weakness of these standard definitions is the criterion of violence in a traditional form. Analysts pointing to computer “virus” sabotage incidents warn that terrorists' acts could include more sophisticated forms of destruction and extortion such as disabling a national infrastructure by penetrating vital computer software. Finally, the October 12, 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing of a U.S. military vessel raises issues of whether the standard definition would categorize this attack as terrorist, as the Cole may not qualify as a “non-combatant”
Current definitions of terrorism all share one common element: politically motivated behavior. Such definitions do not include violence for financial profit or religious motivation.
Additionally, the rapid growth of transnational criminal organizations and the growing range and scale of such operations could well result in their use of violence to achieve objectives with financial profit as the driving motivation. Thus, although the basic assumption today is that all terrorist acts are politically motivated, some are driven by other factors, and this number may grow in light of expanding international criminal activity and an increasing number of extremist acts carried out in the name of religious and cultural causes. A new approach might focus more on defining terrorist acts, giving less emphasis to the motivation behind the acts.
U.S. Policy Response Framework
Past Administrations have employed a range of options to combat international terrorism, from diplomacy and international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures and military force. The application of sanctions is one of the most frequently used anti-terrorist tools of U.S. policymakers. Governments supporting international terrorism (as identified by the Department of State) are prohibited from receiving U.S. economic and military assistance. Export of munitions to such countries is foreclosed; restrictions are imposed on exports of “dual use” equipment such as aircraft and trucks.
In the wake of the September 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, President Bush, in addressing the nation, stressed that the United States in responding to the attacks, will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. The President characterized the incidents as “acts of war.” Secretary of State Colin Powell called for a “full scale assault against terrorism” and announced plans to launch a worldwide coalition against terrorism. A military response option, once perpetrators and/or supporters have been identified, is a strong probability. Most experts agree that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as possible; disrupt terrorist plans and organizations before they act; and organize multinational cooperation against terrorists and countries that support them. The U.N.'s role in mandating sanctions against Libya for its responsibility in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing was significant as the first instance when the world community imposed sanctions against a country in response to its complicity in an act of terrorism. Several factors made the action possible.
First, terrorism has touched many more countries in recent years, forcing governments to put aside parochial interests. (Citizens from over 30 countries have reportedly died in Libyan-sponsored bombings.) Second, the end of the Cold War has contributed to increased international cooperation against terrorism.
And third, U.S. determination to punish terrorist countries, by military force in some instances, once their complicity was established, was a major factor spurring other countries to join U.N.-sponsored action.
In the past, governments have often preferred to handle terrorism as a national problem without outside interference. Some governments were also wary of getting involved in others battles and possibly attracting additional terrorism in the form of reprisals. Others were reluctant to join in sanctions if their own trade interests might be damaged or they sympathized with the perpetrators' cause. Finally, there is the persistent problem of extraditing terrorists without abandoning the long-held principle of asylum for persons fleeing persecution for legitimate political or other activity.
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